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Abstract We examine the influence of two distinct regime changes in US border
security on the number of persons traveling from the US into Mexico on day trips.
In contrast to increases in overall US tourism to Mexico and rapidly growing trade
linkages, day trips to Mexico fell by over 20 % between 2000 and 2012. In the
popular press, the reduction in short visits is widely attributed to a rising tide of
violence in the Mexican border states, more specifically to a rise in the rate of
homicides as a result of the emergence, or radical transformation, of a drug war in
Mexico. We show that changes in the US border regime caused a large reduction of
day trips and border tourism, and in doing so had a large negative effect on the
Mexican border. We situate this result within the literature devoted to analyzing the
effects of changes in international documents on tourist flows.
Keywords Tourism  Constraints to travel  Regional integration  Border security
JEL Classification F15  F52  R21
1 Introduction: Globalization and the border
If globalization is conceived as the movement towards a borderless world, the
physical interface between the US and Mexico can only be a study in contradictions.
On the one hand, flows of goods have continued to increase along with, if not faster
than, the general trend towards greater vertical specialization in the world economy.
China’s entry into the world economy considerably dampened the hopes that
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NAFTA had raised for Mexican export performance, but by now there are clear
signs that US–Mexican integration continues apace. Financial integration has
clearly accompanied the integration of trade and production (Lahrech and Sylwester
2013). Of course barriers to the movement of people have not fallen at the same
pace, and remain politically fraught. Rivers of ink have been devoted to the causes,
consequences and regulation of migration over the border, but the very shortest of
trans-border trips, in which someone comes and goes within the same day—perhaps
within a few hours—have gone relatively unattended. On one level this is quite
understandable since such short trips are necessarily confined to the border region,
unlike immigration which has effects throughout both nations. Yet changes in the
regulations governing very short trips are of tremendous local consequence. They
also have wider national consequence to the extent that the communities that
constitute the border loom increasingly large within their national economies and
populations.
Border regions can either be vibrant areas of commercial interchange that
contribute to the dynamism of their larger economies, or at the other extreme, they
can be relatively isolated, peripheral areas where stagnation reduces national
progress. In a much cited conceptual paper on cross-border contact, based primarily
on the US–Mexican border, Martinez (1994) categorizes borderlands into four
categories: alienated, where due to hostility cross-border interaction is severely
restricted; co-existent, with limited binational integration; interdependent, where a
mutually beneficial economic system is created through the flow of resources and
people across the border; and integrated, where barriers to trade and human
movements have been eliminated, and the border economies are functionally
merged. In the spirit of Martinez’s view of an integrated border, Cooper and
Rumford (2013) argue that borders must be regarded as mechanisms of connectivity
and encounter rather than markers of division. An example of such a border is
discussed in Prokkola’s (2010) study of the transition of the internal border regions
of the European Union. Focusing on tourism in the frontier between Finland and
Sweden, Prokkola finds that border permeability has contributed to dissolution of
mental boundaries in the region.
In this paper, we examine two periods that experienced dramatic changes in the
rules and regulations governing movement between the US and Mexico. The rules
concern the documentation that US residents need to produce in order to reenter the
US from Mexico. We seek to establish whether these changes in regulations are
important in explaining the reduction, over the past two decades, in day trips from
the US into Mexico (and back). This reduction in day trips stands in marked contrast
to the increasing volumes of goods and services trade, as well as tourism that is not
associated with the border. We begin (in Sect. 2) with a very short discussion of the
importance of the border region to the Mexican economy, and the role that short
visits may play in the border region’s economic and social development. We then
provide (in Sect. 3) a provisional outline of the two changes to the border crossing
regulatory regime that have been of considerable consequence for recorded cross-
border day trips. We also briefly discuss a critical confounding factor, namely the
dramatic increase in the homicide rate within the Mexican border states. Sections 4
and 5 present estimates of the impact of the two regulatory regime changes on day
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trips. The conclusion summarizes the implications of our analysis for the growth
and transformation of the border economy and the tourism sector.
2 Tourism in ‘‘la Frontera Norte’’
As in many developing economies, tourism has had a significant role in Mexico’s
economic development.1 In one of the first empirical investigations of tourism in
Mexico, Stronge and Redman (1982) found tourism along the border by Americans
was income and price elastic, while tourism in the interior was inelastic with respect
to Mexican prices. Clancy (1999), in a study primarily focused on the political
economy of the role of tourism in economic development, provides useful data on
the growth of tourism in Mexico in the period 1970–1994, and concludes that the
state played a crucial role in its growth. Of particular interest to our paper, he
recognizes that when developing countries promote tourism, ‘‘they are, in effect,
embracing greater integration into the world economy’’ (Clancy 1999, p. 2).
We might also briefly mention some studies of border tourism in other countries
which are germane to our analysis. Hampton (2010) examined the impact of tourism
from Singapore on border communities in both southern Malaysia and western
Indonesia, and concludes that it generated employment, income, and local economic
linkages, with cross-border ethnic ties playing an important role. David et al. (2011)
focus on the border regions of Hungary, and find, not surprisingly, that accession to
the EU had a positive impact on cross-border tourism. In a survey of border tourism
in the Balkans, Lagiewski and Revelas (2004) find that the most commonly
identified problems in expanding tourism revolve around the ease and convenience
of border crossing.
In 2012, the travel and tourism industry contributed 1272 billion pesos to
Mexican GDP (8.4 % of the total), and employed 2.95 million workers, 6.3 % of
total employment (INEGI).2 The government of Mexico keeps detailed figures on
the number of tourists (and their expenditure), and breaks down the total into several
categories, based on the length of their stay and where they travel. The official
categories are:
Excursionistas Fronterizos: international visitors who come only for a day trip
and remain in the border zone.
Pasajeros en Crucero: cruise ship passengers (who are not considered tourists
because they do not spend the night in Mexico).
Excursionistas Internacionales: the sum of border visitors and cruise ship
visitors.
1 The contributions of tourism to economic development have been well documented, and development
agencies have set up units to promote it (Brohman 1996; Sharpley and Telfer 2002). The World Tourism
Organization, established in 1975, became a UN specialized agency in 2003. The World Bank established
a Tourism Projects Department in 1969. Both institutions currently view tourism as having a major role in
Millennium Development Goals (Mann 2005).
2 Mexico was ranked No. 2 among Latin American countries, in the World Economic Forum’s report on
travel and tourism competitiveness (Blanke and Chiesa 2013).
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Turismo al Interior: international visitors who stay overnight, and go beyond the
border zone.
Turismo Fronterizo: international visitors who stay overnight, but remain in the
border zone.
Turismo al Interior: international visitors who stay overnight outside of the
border zone.
Turistas Internacionales: international visitors who stay overnight in Mexico.
Visitantes Internacionales a Me´xico: all visitors who come to Mexico and stay for
no more than a year.3
Tourism has been particularly important in Mexico’s border states; e.g., the first
detailed study showed that in 1994, it accounted for 9.4 % of output, 8.6 % of
employment, and 17 % of investment in Baja California (Secretarı´a de Turismo-
REDES Sociedad Civil 1996).4 After the initiation of NAFTA, tourism expanded
rapidly. While tourist destinations further south are better known, historically about
80 % of tourists stayed within the six Mexican border states. The vast majority of
these are excursionistas or –as we will call them—day trips. The motivations behind
day trips vary widely but prominently include family visits, work, and cross-border
shopping. Prices of goods and services are sometimes quite different across the
border, with pharmaceuticals and medical services notably attracting customers
from the North. Day trips also reflect family visits and weekend leisure activity. The
role of cross-border shopping can be crucial in frontier cities, and while we have not
come across quantitative measures of their significance on the Mexican side of the
border, studies on the US side estimate that Mexican shoppers account for 40–45 %
of retail purchases in Laredo, 35–40 % in McAllen, 30–35 % in Brownsville, and
10–15 % in El Paso (Coronado and Phillips 2012).
While the United States has long had concerns about illegal immigration from
Mexico,5 the border was quite easy to cross for US residents. A driver’s license and
an oral declaration of citizenship generally sufficed, and for those who lived in
frontier cities, crossing the border to shop was little different from shopping in an
adjacent suburb.6 By the end of the twentieth century, the border had become quite
‘‘thin’’, and the economies on each side of the border were becoming increasingly
integrated. As noted by Thompson (2008), ‘‘…a common border culture…was
helping to integrate northern Mexico with the southern US’’. As a result Mexico’s
northern border zone or ‘‘la frontera norte’’ has been an important contributor to
Mexican growth. The six Mexican states that border the US capture a large and
relatively prosperous part of Mexico. By 2013 the six states contained 17 % of
Mexico’s population and produced 22.5 % of its GDP. They also exhibit relatively
3 We focus on the number of day trips, Excursionistas Fronterizos, which is a contributory element of
both Turismo Fronterizo and Visitantes Internacionales a Me´xico.
4 Comparable figures for the Mexican economy as whole were 5.7, 5, and 11.2 %.
5 In September 2001, there were 9061 US border patrol agents deployed along the Mexican border, while
331 were at the Canadian border (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 2006).
6 One of the authors recalls, while living in Laredo (Texas), easily walking across the bridge to Nuevo
Laredo for lunch and shopping.
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high human development indices and contain relatively fewer workers earning the
minimum salary (Bringas Ra´bago 2005).
In Fig. 1 we contrast the change in day trips over time to the growth of US trade
with Mexico. To reiterate these are trips originating in the US that do not result in
overnight stays within Mexico. We index the number of day trips per year as well as
US–Mexico trade (which we measure as the annual dollar value of US imports from
Mexico) to 100 in 1994. The reduction of day trips stands in obvious contrast to the
nearly sixfold increase in trade. Trade recovers robustly from the 2001 and 2008
recessions, but day trips clearly do not. Day trips remain at lower levels after each of
the recessions. The unaided eye cannot easily determine the recessions’ impacts on
day trips since big changes in border regulations happen in close temporal proximity
to the recessions. The first change in border procedures occurred in response to the
terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 which was 6 months after the NBER’s turning point of
March 2001. The second change in border procedures occurred only 1 month after
the NBER’s December 2007 turning point. Figure 2 lets us see the movement of day
trips in more detail since we now contrast it with the number of international tourists
which does not grow as dramatically as the value of trade flows. Nevertheless, the
number of international tourist visits to Mexico rises by nearly 40 % over our period
while we can now see that the number of day trips per year falls by more than 20 %.
Figure 3 gives us some sense of the much greater size of border tourism relative to
interior tourism.
The diminution of day trips over the past decade and a half has mirrored the
declining fortunes of Mexican border towns.7 The popular press attributes this
exclusively to the rise of violence and insecurity on the border subsequent to the
Fig. 1 US imports from Me´xico versus day trips to Me´xico. Source: Banco de Me´xico, COMTRADE
7 By 2014 the popular press has focused on attempts by Mexican border towns to revive some of their
previously thriving tourism trade, e.g., Rodriguez (2014).
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drugs war, initiated by the Caldero´n administration. Undoubtedly the rise in crime
reduced day trips and tourism to Mexico.8 However, we hope to show that changes
in the rules and regulations concerning crossing the border have had a practically
and statistically significant effect on day trips. It is difficult to see how a reduction in
legitimate commerce associated with a reduction in day trips caused by a change in
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Fig. 3 International visits to Me´xico. Source: Banco de Me´xico
8 As Sirakaya et al. (1997) emphasize it is the perceptions of safety that affects tourists choice of
destination.
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border procedures could have done anything other than increase criminal activity.9
To the extent that it did so we will underestimate the effect of the change in border
procedures in what follows: since we will take the homicide rate (our measure of
day trip deterring criminality) to be exogenous we underestimate the effect of
tighter border restrictions.
3 Changes to the Border Regime
Andreas (2003) discusses the immediate impact of 9/11/2001 on border procedures
and wait times on both the Canadian and Mexican borders. President Vincete Fox’s
vision of an open US–Mexico border was among the early casualties of 9/11.
Andreas notes that the increasing US expenditure on border security in the 1990s
had not resulted in increased wait times at border crossing points, indeed wait times
generally fell. In contrast after 9/11:
The high-intensity border checks following the bombings put a noticeable
brake on cross-border flows. In Laredo, Texas, for example, during peak
crossing times before the attacks, it took about 5 min for a pedestrian to cross
a bridge checkpoint and half an hour for a motorist. Immediately after the
attacks, the wait increased up to 5 h. Officials counted 2.9 million people
entering Laredo from Mexico in September 2001—down from 3.5 million in
September 2000. Retail sales in US border cities immediately plummeted as
Mexican shoppers stayed south of the border. (Andreas 2003, p. 8)
The effects of changes at the border were apparently sufficiently strong for San
Diego to declare a state of economic emergency.
The second change in border crossing procedures occurred between 2008 and
2009. During this period the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) came
into effect.10 On 31 Jan 2008 US authorities on the border ceased accepting oral
declarations of citizenship. US and Canadian citizens ages 19 and older from then
on needed to present a government-issued photo ID, such as a driver’s license, along
with proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate or naturalization certificate.
‘‘On and after January 31, 2008, all adult travelers must present proof of
citizenship and identity when entering the US through a land or sea border.
Citizenship and identity can be established by presentation of a single
document, such as a passport or trusted traveler program card, or by
presentation of multiple documents, such as a birth certificate, and proof of
identity, such as a driver’s license.’’(Garvey Schubert Barer Law 2007)
In June of 2009 this requirement was further strengthened. Under the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHIT) travelers were then required to present a
9 For a broad view of the issues at stake, see the Wilson Center’s State of the Border Report (Wilson and
Lee 2013).
10 WHTI is a joint Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of State (DOS) plan that
implemented 9/11 Commission Recommendations as well as a Congressional mandate.
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passport or the equivalent electronically readable border crossing card in order to
reenter the US. Implementation began 1 June 2009 (Commerce 2014; Security
2008).11
4 Estimating border effects
We use data collected by Mexican authorities that, unlike US data, distinguishes day
trips from longer trips. The two changes in border procedure and document
requirements divide our monthly data into three periods: an early period that lasts
until 9/11, a middle period from September 2001 to January 2008 and a late period
extending from February 2008 to December 2012. Since we are working with
monthly data, we end the first period in August of 2001 and the second in December
of 2007. We use data on three confounding factors. The NBER declares March of
2001 to be a business cycle peak as well as December of 2007. As we are interested
in short day trips we use a business conditions index for the US border states in
which the states are weighted by population. The individual state indices are from
the Philadelphia FRB (2015) and constructed using Stock and Watson’s (1989)
dynamic single factor model from ‘‘four state-level indicators to summarize current
economic conditions in a single statistic. The four state-level variables in each
coincident index are nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in
manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated
by the consumer price index (US city average).’’
As mentioned at the outset, the discussion of border tourism in the popular press
seems to focus exclusively on the influence of crime and specifically homicides
induced by drugs wars in Mexico. We use data that report the number of homicides
as an indicator of the deterrent effect which violence in Mexico had on short-term
tourism flows. The number of homicides in each of the six Mexican border states is
reported in the INEGI’s SIMBAD database.12 It is reported on a monthly basis.
Since the drugs war is widely considered to be the driving force behind reduced
border tourism we consider three different specifications for the homicide mortality
variable. We consider the total number of homicides in the six border states as well
as its natural log. We consider finally the rate of homicides per 100,000 persons. We
predict the state populations on a monthly basis using the quinquennial census in
order to generate a rate per 100,000 persons. We then create a geometrically
population-weighted average of the six state rates. The mortality data present an
interesting challenge because homicides increase right after the second of our border
regime changes in January of 2008. The increase in the state of Michoaca´n is also
far beyond anything recorded for the other states. These are issues we return to
below. Thirdly since cross-border trips are often undertaken to do shopping, we use
the exchange rate of the US dollar against the Mexican peso, expressed here as the
11 Canally and Timothy (2007) find that border procedures are a significant factor constraining the
decision by US college students (based on a survey conducted at Arizona State University) to cross the
border, but they do not provide an estimate of its impact on tourism flows or its changing importance over
time.
12 Data sources are given at the end of the document.
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dollar cost of a peso.13 The summary statistics for the variables entering our analysis
appear in Table 1.
Table 2 contains estimates from regressing (the natural log of) day trips per
month against the exchange rate, US border state business conditions, and Mexican
border state homicides. Our early period is January 1995 to October 2001; the
middle period dummy is one from September 2001 to January 2008, while the late
period dummy is one from February 2008 to December 2012. The first three
regressions report OLS coefficients. These OLS regressions clearly suffer from
autocorrelation. Our first response to the presence of very strong autocorrelation is
to report HAC corrected (Newey–West) standard errors in equations one, two and
three.14 Three different specifications for mortality due to homicide appear in
Table 2. We examine the total number of homicides in the Mexican border states,
its natural log, and the homicide rate per 100,000 persons.15 The signs on all of the
coefficients are as expected. We expect that better US business conditions should
increase trips to Mexico. We expect that a higher US dollar cost of the peso should
reduce trips to Mexico. We expect that homicides reduce trips as would the two
changes to border procedures. The 2001 increases in border security measures are
reported to have reduced day trips by 12 or 13 %, and the 2008 changes to travel
documentation to have reduced it by more, a point estimate in the range of
17–24 %.
The presence of autocorrelation can be interpreted as a signal of misspecification,
and more particularly of a dynamic data-generating process, that requires a time
series approach to the data. In the case of our day trips one can easily envision past
day trips affecting the present through habits, information and socialization.
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Trip: day trips per month 216 5595.336 869.6951 3602.423 7244
Ltrip: log of trips 216 8.616634 0.1656257 8.189362 8.887929
Cond: US border state conditions 216 149.9077 17.07545 113.2512 173.6995
Lcond: log of cond 216 5.0032 0.1187354 4.729609 5.157327
Ex: exchange rate (USD per Peso) 216 0.1001528 0.0212616 0.0682752 0.1772892
Lex, log of ex 216 -2.32128 0.1972617 -2.684208 -1.729973
Homicides: total homicides 216 292.6574 259.8665 95 1175
Lhomicides: log of homicides 216 5.393753 0.6905282 4.553877 7.069024
Geomortrate: average homicide rate
in Mexican border states
216 1.141459 0.8793272 0.3698819 3.736953
Source: INEG, Banco de Me´xico, Philadelphia FRB
13 See Coronado and Phillips (2012) on border shoppers’ sensitivity to the peso.
14 Three lags have been selected for the Newey–West estimates. We can reject the hypothesis of no serial
correlation for all of the OLS regressions.
15 This is a population-weighted geometric average of the homicide rate per 100,000 persons in each
state.
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5 A simple time series examination
Following Box and Tiao (1975), a large number of papers have used intervention
analysis to examine changes in tourism flows in response to traumatic events or
sudden changes in border procedures. For instance the method has been used to
estimate the influence of visa-free entry on Korean travel to Japan (Lee et al. 2010a,
b) as well as the impact of terrorist bombings in Bali on tourism (Lee et al. 2010a,
2010b).16 The ARIMA models that emerged from Box and Jenkins’ (1970, 1976)
work form the core of any intervention analysis, and they have been very widely
used in forecasting tourist demand more generally.17 The basic idea of any
Table 2 OLS and AR(1) results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS/NW OLS/NW OLS/NW AR AR AR
ltrip ltrip ltrip ltrip ltrip ltrip
Lcond 0.261 0.270 0.233 0.675** 0.720** 0.615**
(0.205) (0.200) (0.182) (0.273) (0.319) (0.245)
Lex -0.196** -0.186* -0.193** 0.00648 0.0421 -0.0230
(0.0984) (0.0987) (0.0814) (0.129) (0.132) (0.123)
Middle -0.127*** -0.134*** -0.128*** -0.188*** -0.204*** -0.175***
(0.0323) (0.0297) (0.0305) (0.0531) (0.0655) (0.0461)
Late -0.244*** -0.171*** -0.242*** -0.444*** -0.489*** -0.413***







L.ar 0.731*** 0.783*** 0.682***
(0.0498) (0.0464) (0.0521)
Constant 7.079*** 7.948*** 7.254*** 5.436*** 5.039*** 5.684***
(0.874) (0.883) (0.798) (1.211) (1.454) (1.070)
Sigma 0.0670*** 0.0666*** 0.0669***
(0.00361) (0.00356) (0.00361)
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216
Standard errors in parentheses. Newey–West HAC standard errors
Source: Banco de Me´xico, INEG, Philadelphia FRB
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
16 In this vein see Ismail et al. (2009) and Enders et al. (1992) for uses of intervention models to assess
terrorism’s impact on tourism. ARIMA-based intervention analysis is increasingly used in the health field
(Helfenstein 1991; Imhoff et al. 1998; Jensen 1990).
17 For more general discussions of ARIMA modeling of tourism demand see Chu (1998), Goh and Law
(2002), Kulendran and Witt (2003) and Song and Li 2008).
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intervention analysis is that one fits an ARIMA model to a time series using the data
right up to, but not beyond, some critical event or intervention. From that critical
moment in time forward the ARIMA model is used to ‘dynamically’ forecast the
time series. The resulting dynamic forecast is then regarded as a counterfactual
outcome: what would have happened absent the critical event? (For instance what
would tourism have been in Bali had there been no bombings?) ARIMA forecasts of
tourism demand are generally multivariate: in addition to past tourist flows (the AR
or auto regressive part of ARIMA) they use income, relevant prices and other
information to forecast present tourism flows. In the multivariate case the
dynamically forecasted values are generated using all of the additional explanatory
variables, but within the AR component of the model the lagged values of the
dependent variable (tourism) are replaced by the predicted values once we cross the
time of the critical event or intervention. Again the dependent variable has been
shocked or shifted by something, and we want to see what would have happened in
the absence of that something.
The results of intervention analysis can be quite sensitive to the way the ARIMA
model is fit. Hence analysis may engage in fairly elaborate comparisons of
alternative ARIMA specifications including automating the process of fitting the
ARIMA.18 Clements and Hendry (1995) draw attention to the critically important
assumption that there is a time-invariant data-generating process at work. In our
case, there does not seem to be an invariant data-generating process. The key
problem that confronts us lies in the fact that the homicide rate spikes in early 2008,
just as our late period begins. Prior to that time the homicide rate was extremely low
in comparison and showed no discernible trend. This complicates estimating the
influence of our second border shock, the January 2008 change in document
requirements. An auto regressive model of order one, AR(1), is arguably the
simplest version of an ARIMA process. The AR(1) model is one simple response to
autocorrelation among errors:
yt ¼ xtbþ et ð1Þ
et ¼ qet1 þ mt  1\q\1; mt is iid: ð2Þ
The AR(1) may be written as:
yt ¼ qyt1 þ bðxt  qxt1Þ þ mt: ð3Þ
Table 3 presents AR(1) estimates of the determinants of day trips using the same
three specifications of homicide mortality as we examined using OLS/Newey–West.
The results are quite unlike OLS in that only when homicides are entered as a rate
do they have a negative influence on day trips. The exchange rate also has an
unexpectedly positive sign in the other formulations. In contrast, the point estimates
for the effect of the two border changes are relatively stable: the 2001 change
reduced trips by 18–20 % and the 2008 change by 42–49 %. These effects are
18 The US Census department’s X11 and X12 are popular examples for automatically fitting ARIMA
models, but a variety of approaches have been explored (Ho¨glund and O¨stermark 1991; Melard and
Pasteels 2000).
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considerably larger than the OLS point estimates and it is important to understand
how that difference relates to the behavior of trips and homicides over time.
In Fig. 4, we graph the log of trips over time as well as the fitted values and
dynamic predictions of the AR(1) regression. The AR(1) regression is run using data
up to 2001 m8 and then dynamically forecasted thereafter. This provides an
intervention analysis of the first border event and we regard the dynamic prediction
as the counterfactual path of (log) day trips in a world in which there had been no
changes to the border in response to 9/11. The second projection in the graph begins
in February of 2008 and is made after estimating the AR(1) through January of
2008. It can be regarded as a counterfactual prediction of what the (log) of day trips
would have been in the presence of the 9/11 shock to the border procedures but
absent the January 2008 increase in documentation requirements.
Let us start by looking at the later period in Fig. 4 beginning in 2008. The second
projection is made using the AR(1) estimated up to January 2008. That is regression
three in Table 3 and it reports a positive coefficient on the homicide mortality
variable. It simply seems that homicides were not a clearly negative influence on
day trips before 2008. As a result, the upwards movement of the second
counterfactual projection is (quite perversely) driven in large part by the sudden
Table 3 Period analysis
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Whole Early Early and middle Middle Late
ltrip ltrip ltrip ltrip ltrip
Lcond 0.615** 1.002*** 0.353 -0.322 1.863
(0.245) (0.168) (0.236) (0.319) (2.078)
Geomortrate -0.0192 0.0489 0.0531 0.0330 0.0190
(0.0149) (0.0528) (0.0483) (0.0789) (0.0182)
Lex -0.0230 -0.0420 -0.232 0.165 -0.117





L.ar 0.682*** 0.0353 0.582*** 0.501*** 0.877***
(0.0521) (0.126) (0.0603) (0.104) (0.0806)
Constant 5.684*** 3.701*** 6.460*** 10.68*** -1.443
(1.070) (0.676) (0.932) (1.239) (10.88)
Sigma 0.0669*** 0.0502*** 0.0641*** 0.0638*** 0.0653***
(0.00361) (0.00493) (0.00372) (0.00525) (0.00776)
Observations 216 80 156 76 60
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Banco de Me´xico, INEG, Philadelphia FRB
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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spike in homicides in 2008 and after.19 Table 3 presents the estimates of the
homicide rate formulation of the AR(1) for different time periods. We see the early,
middle and late periods separately. The data from the early period is used to
estimate the coefficients for the model that produces the first dynamic forecast,
while the data from both the early and middle period is used to estimate the
coefficients used to produce the second dynamic forecast. In both cases the
coefficients on mortality are positive, so that when mortality suddenly increases in
2008 this causes the dynamically prediction to perversely rise rather than fall.20
To visualize the size of the problem at hand we have graphed a very simple
adjustment to the second projection. This is the short dashed line that begins in the
same place as the second projection but lies below it. We have subtracted from the
second projection the perverse positive effect of homicides and we have also
appealed to the AR(1) regression for the whole span of data (regression one) to tell
us how much we should further lower the projection to account for the negative
effect of homicides in the late period.21 So the dashed line is simply the projection
less (0.0531 ? 0.0192)*geomortalityrate: the first term removes the perversely
positive influence of homicides and the second accounts for the negative influence
of homicides using the parameter from the full period AR(1). Visually this
downwards adjustment of the late period projection is quite significant. It seems to
Fig. 4 Log trips to Me´xico and projections. Source: Banco de Me´xico, INEG, Philadelphia FRB
19 Note that only the AR(1) for the whole period reports a negative coefficient on homicides. Not even
the AR(1) for the late period does—the negative influence of homicides is only revealed when we look
across the periods.
20 We also see substantial changes to our coefficients over the various sub periods. This suggests that we
do not have an unchanging data-generating process.
21 We could have appealed to the Prais regression in Table Two, which reports a very similar coefficient
on homicides, but we prefer to bias the results against the hypothesis that the border changes have
significantly reduced day trips.
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roughly halve the yawning gap between the projection and the number of actual
trips.
Figure 5 displays the gaps between our projected (log) values and the actual (log)
number of trips. The gap between the originally forecasted values and the actual
values is labeled ‘‘second projection’’. It rises to 0.6 (which is 60 %) by the end of
2012. The average gap between the projected and actual values is 0.42 % over the
late period. As we expect, this is essentially the same number as reported in the
coefficients for the late dummy variable in the AR(1) for the full period. Once we
adjust the late period projection downwards, the gap is considerably smaller. It is
represented by the dashed line in Fig. 5 labeled ‘second lowered’ which begins at 0
in January 2008 and reaches 0.4 (or 40 %) by the end of 2012. The average gap is
24 % which happens to be very close to the estimates of the late period dummy
produced by the OLS/Newey–West regressions. Given this result we are inclined to
regard the AR(1) estimates of a roughly 40 % or more reduction of day trips due to
the documentation requirements imposed in January of 2008 as excessive. We are
led to regard something around 24 % as more likely as an estimate of the average
impact in the late period, but we must not forget that the downwards adjusted AR(1)
projection was climbing and had already attained 0.4 (40 %) by the end of our data.
What about the middle period? What impact did the post 9/11 changes to border
procedures have on day trips prior to the early 2008 changes in document
requirements? In this case, our procedure of adjusting the AR(1) projection
downwards to adjust for the influence of homicides is almost exactly the same, we
subtract (0.0489 ? 0.0192)*geomortrate from the AR(1) projection that begins in
September of 2001.22 Figure 3 shows the AR(1) projection as a solid line and there












Fig. 5 Projected visit reductions. Source: Banco de Me´xico, INEG, Philadelphia FRB
22 We subtract (0.0489 ? 0.0192)*geomortrate rather than (0.0531 ? 0.0192)*geomortrate, because the
coefficient on the homicide mortality rate is slightly different in regressions 2 and 3 of Table 3.
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downwards adjustment prior to 2008. That is simply because the homicide rate is
very low until 2008. In this case the unadjusted gap between the (log of the)
projected values and the (log of the) actual number of day trips is 0.21 (21 %) and
the adjusted is 0.17 (17 %). These are averages over the middle period but by
December 2007 it had risen to 0.26 (26 %).
6 Conclusions
We have found that the flow of short-term visits over the US–Mexico border was
significantly reduced by the changes to border procedures set in train by 9/11. Our
findings add to the literature on the importance of border documents and visas for
tourism flows. The reductions in border tourism and day trips were clearly of
tremendous importance for the Mexican border economy and particularly for its
tourism and retail sector. The potential size of the reduction in spending is quite
large. As it is the Secretarı`a de Turismo (2014) estimates that total spending by
persons on day trips (Excursionistas internacionales sin pernocta) was 1.53 billion
USD in 2012. How much larger might that figure have been had there been no
border changes?
The AR(1) time series estimates are consistent with the OLS regression’s 24 %
estimated reduction in day trips after the second of the two border changes (January
2008). The average gap between the AR(1) forecasted path of day trips and the
actual path of day trips is also 24 %, but only once we adjust the forecast
downwards to better account for the sudden rise of homicides after 2008. Of course
averages contain variations over time and that gap was estimated to be quite a bit
larger by 2012 than it started in 2008—it had become a nearly 40 % gap. Even
larger gaps appear in Fig. 5 when we forecasted day trips beginning back in 2001
rather than 2008. The average gap between our (downwards adjusted) first
prediction and the actual number of day trips was 47 % after 2008, but again the gap
was rising and became 60 % by 2012. These are really very large effects so it is
worth recalling that day trips fell some 20 % from 2000 to 2012 while international
tourism to the interior of Mexico rose some 40 %. So the notion that day trips (and
associated spending) might have been 60 % higher had there been no changes to
border procedures should not be regarded as inherently implausible.23 Growth of
60 % would still have paled in comparison to the sixfold increase in the value of
international trade across the same period.
We do not think that the data at our disposal is well suited to examining whether
and how changes in day trips and legitimate commerce affected homicides and the
drugs wars in Mexico. But it is difficult to see how the reduction in legitimate
commerce associated with the contraction of day trips could have helped the
situation. To our minds the natural assumption is that the contraction in legitimate
commerce exacerbated the problem. To the extent that this is true we underestimate
23 A recent study of the effect of more stringent security measures at the US–Canadian border (Lipovic
et al. 2015) found the flow of American day-trippers to Canada had been reduced by 59 %, while
Canadian day trips to the US had been curtailed by 50 %.
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the negative influence of the border restrictions. But we think that considerable
geographic and political detail would be needed to evaluate the issue with any
success.24
We have tried to respond responsibly to the estimation problems created by the
fact that homicides in Mexico rose quickly on the heels of our second change in
border procedures. It would certainly be better to have information at the household
level on the number of trips made to specific places in Mexico along with
demographic and economic characteristics. Ideally this would be matched with
survey information that reported something about their typical motivations for
crossing the border as well as their level of concern about violence over the border.
But even with only highly aggregated information we have been able to conclude
that changes in US border procedures have had a large and enduringly negative
impact on tourism and travel on the Mexican border, one that has clearly been
economically and socially meaningful. The wider message for the tourism and
hospitality industry is that changes to border procedures bear very close attention.
6.1 Data sources
1. Banco de Me´xico. Day Trips (Excursionistas Fronterizos) REPORTE DE
FLUJOS TURI´STICOS A ME´XICO—REPORTE MENSUAL http://www.
siimt.com/en/siimt/siim_flujos_mensuales
2. Philadelphia FRB Monthly coincident index for each of the 50 states. http://
www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/regional-economy/indexes/
coincident/
3. Intituto Nacional De Estadistica Y Geografa, Sistema Estatal y Municipal de
Bases de Datos (SIMBAD), Homicide rates by state Defunciones por homicidio
http://sc.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cobdem/resultados.jsp?w=18&Backidhecho=
18&Backconstem=17&constembd=208
Results produced by STATA do file: LAERfinal1.
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